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Behind the GATE Experiment: 
Evidence on Effects of and Rationales  
for Subsidized Entrepreneurship Training †
By Robert W. Fairlie, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman *
Theories of market failures and targeting motivate the promotion 
of entrepreneurship training programs and generate testable pre-
dictions regarding heterogeneous treatment effects from such pro-
grams. Using a large randomized evaluation in the United States, 
we find no strong or lasting effects on those most likely to face credit 
or human capital constraints, or labor market discrimination. We do 
find a short-run effect on business ownership for those unemployed 
at baseline, but this dissipates at longer horizons. Treatment effects 
on the full sample are also short-term and limited in scope: we do 
not find effects on business sales, earnings, or employees. (JEL I26, 
J24, J68, L25, L26, M13)
Governments and donors spend billions of dollars subsidizing entrepreneur-ship training programs around the world. In the United States alone, there 
exist more than 1,000 Small Business Administration-subsidized Small Business 
Development Centers (SBDC) and at least 800 other nonprofit programs providing 
self-employment training and other assistance.1 Arguments for subsidizing train-
ing are manifold, and span theories of allocative and/or redistributive frictions in 
credit, labor, insurance, and human capital markets. But these arguments have been 
difficult to evaluate empirically due to classic endogeneity problems from selection 
into training. Thus, surprisingly little is known about the overall effectiveness of 
1 SBDCs exist in all 50 states and are administered and funded through partnerships between the SBA and 
public colleges and nonprofits. See http://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-development-centers-sbdcs for a 
directory of SBDCs, Edgcomb and Girardo (2012) for information on other nonprofit programs, and European 
Commission (2010) for a description of programs in the European Union. 
* Fairlie: Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 (e-mail: rfairlie@ucsc.
edu); Karlan: Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, and IPA, J-PAL, and National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (e-mail: dean.karlan@yale.edu); Zinman: Department of Economics, 
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, and IPA, J-PAL, and NBER (e-mail: jonathan.zinman@dartmouth.edu). 
We thank David Card, Jesse Cunha, Herb Scheutze, Morten Sorensen, David Sraer, Mirjam van Praag, Martin 
Sweeney, and seminar participants at the SOLE Meetings, NBER, University of California Berkeley, University 
of British Columbia, University of California-Santa Cruz, Harvard/IZA Evaluation Conference, Duke/Kauffman 
Entrepreneurship Conference, HEC Paris Entrepreneurship Conference, Tinbergen Institute, Copenhagen Business 
School, and WEA meetings for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Jonathan Simonetta at the US 
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entrepreneurship training or whether this training mitigates market or redistributive 
frictions.2
We address these limitations by analyzing a large randomized trial on entre-
preneurship training in the United States: Project Growing America through 
Entrepreneurship (GATE).3 The uniquely large size of this study permits several 
tests of heterogeneous treatment effects that speak to the key arguments for subsi-
dizing training.
Project GATE was a longitudinal study conducted by the US Department of 
Labor and the Small Business Administration (SBA) in which free entrepreneurship 
training was randomly offered to individuals interested in starting or improving a 
business. More than 4,000 individuals applied for a limited number of slots at 14 dif-
ferent SBDCs and nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs) located across 
seven sites in three states. SBDCs and CBOs are the predominant providers of entre-
preneurship training services in the US market. Subjects assigned to the treatment 
group were offered an array of best-practice training services, whereas subjects 
assigned to the control group were not offered any free services. Follow-up surveys 
at 6, 18, and 60 months after treatment assignment yield a rich set of outcome mea-
sures. The 60-month follow-up provides rare measures of long-run outcomes.
Our estimates of average treatment effects suggest that entrepreneurship training 
has limited impacts on business ownership, scale, and income. Entrepreneurship 
training does dramatically increase the likelihood of business ownership in the 
short-run (by 13 percentage points in the full sample at the 6-month follow-up, 
on a base of 36 percentage points), but this effect depreciates over time: we do not 
find significant effects at 18 or 60 months. Nor do we find evidence that training 
affects other outcomes—including measures of business scale, business profitabil-
ity performance, household income, and work satisfaction—at any horizon (6, 18, 
or 60 months). We show that these estimates are not overly sensitive to reasonable 
assumptions about how attrition affects the composition of the treatment and control 
groups. Overall, the only significant full-sample average treatment effects, across a 
large number of tests, are on six-month business ownership and six-month employ-
ment status.4
2 In contrast, a large literature evaluates job training and job search assistance programs (e.g., see Card, Kluve, 
and Weber 2010). 
3 The only previous randomized trial conducted in the United States was a smaller demonstration experiment of 
self-employment training for Unemployment Insurence (UI) recipients in Washington and Massachusetts (Benus 
et al. 1994). That study found positive program impacts on self-employment, total earnings, and job creation, but 
in addition to training the assistance program allowed for concurrent UI benefit payments and a lump-sum benefit 
payment. Several recent experiments of the effects of business training on micro-entrepreneurs have been conducted 
in developing countries (Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden 2011; Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014; Karlan and 
Valdivia 2011; Karlan, Knight, and Udry 2012; Field, Jayachandran, and Pande 2010). These studies have generally 
found some positive, but mixed, results. The results of this literature may be informative, but not generalizable, to the 
developed country context, in which the content of entrepreneurship training, education level of trainees, and types of 
businesses being created are very different, and where formal labor, financial and business markets are more open and 
accessible. For related research using nonrandomized approaches to identifying effects of self-employment training 
programs, see, e.g., Kosanovich and Fleck (2001), Rodriguez-Planas (2010), Almeida and Galasso (2010), and for 
random and quasi-experimental approaches to studying entrepreneurship education for college and younger students, 
see Huber, Sloof, and van Praag (2012) and Oosterbeek, van Praag, and Ijsselstein (2010). 
4 Our estimates of full-sample treatment effects differ from those in the final evaluation report delivered to the 
US Department of Labor (Benus et al. 2009) due to several differences in approaches to analyzing the data, includ-
ing dealing with attrition and nonresponse. Section IVG provides details. 
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The lack of significant average treatment effects does not appear to be due to a 
weak treatment (lack of compliance, quality, intensity, a sunk cost effect,5 etc.). 
We find that the GATE assignment to treatment produced a 136 percent short-term 
increase and a 45 percent long-term increase in the amount of training received. 
Recipients reported the training as useful in follow-up surveys, and the treatment 
group was 11–13 percentage points more likely to create a business plan. As dis-
cussed above, we do find very large short-term effects on business ownership. In 
all, the results strongly suggest that training changes short-term behavior but not 
long-run outcomes.
We also provide novel results on heterogeneous treatment effects, using these 
interactions to shed light on the empirical importance of various rationales offered 
for training subsidies. Credit constraints are one rationale offered for training sub-
sidies: if training is valuable but potential recipients lack the liquidity to pay for it, 
offering low-cost training may be a cost-effective way to improve access (compared 
to subsidizing lending, for instance). Training may also improve financial access by 
providing information, advice, and assistance in obtaining financing. Labor market 
discrimination is a second rationale for training subsidies: if minorities face greater 
discrimination from employers than from customers or lenders, then subsidizing 
training may be a relatively efficient method of helping minorities overcome bar-
riers to starting businesses and avoid future discrimination in the labor market. A 
third rationale for training subsidies is human and managerial capital constraints: 
if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, then low-cost train-
ing may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute services to the most-affected 
parties. Unemployment insurance frictions are a fourth rationale for training sub-
sidies: training may be a relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by pro-
viding recipients with incentives to work by creating a job for themselves (and 
perhaps others).
We do not find evidence supporting the credit constraint, discrimination, and 
human capital constraint arguments. We do find limited support for the unemploy-
ment insurance friction hypothesis: the effect of entrepreneurship training on busi-
ness ownership at six months is significantly greater for those who were initially 
unemployed compared with those who were employed at baseline. However, we do 
not find any other evidence of relatively strong effects for the unemployed, nor do 
we find any evidence of lasting effects for the unemployed.
In all, the lack of positive treatment effects in the full sample and in key sub-
groups, is particularly striking, given that any reporting biases in the follow-up sur-
veys probably push in the direction of finding positive effects.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides more details on 
GATE, including its research design and implementation, the nature of the training 
services received by subjects, and external validity. Section II presents first-stage 
5 A sunk cost effect refers to the possibility that those who receive free training would have purchased training 
had it not been offered for free, but then they took it less seriously because it was free. This would lead to an under-
estimate of the impact of unsubsidized training. 
6 It strikes us as sensible to worry that treated individuals might report better outcomes to self-justify their own 
investment in training, to express gratitude to the training provider or funder for getting free training, and/or if they 
are mistakenly concerned that eligibility for continued support is contingent on showing progress. 
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results on training and business practices. Section III presents estimates of average 
and distributional effects on business ownership, scale, and performance, including 
a bounds analysis addressing differential attrition. Section IV presents estimates of 
heterogeneous treatment effects to test hypotheses about the (redistributive) effi-
ciency of self-employment training. Section V concludes.
I. The Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) Experiment
A. Evaluation Design
Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) was an evaluation 
designed and implemented by the US Department of Labor (DOL) and the US Small 
Business Administration (SBA). GATE’s objective was to “help emerging entre-
preneurs in rural and urban communities achieve the American dream of owning 
their own business.”7 The evaluation was designed to capture existing representative 
training providers (Section IIB) and recipients (Section IID). The treatment phase of 
the evaluation ran from September 2003 to July 2005 in seven sites that represented 
both urban and rural areas. Follow-up surveys were mailed 6, 18, and 60 months 
after random assignment.
Individuals entered the study by completing an application process for a standard 
offer of free training from 1 of 14 established providers described in Section IIB.8 
The application process started with an orientation meeting at 1 of 21 One-Stop 
Career Centers in the 7 sites. Anyone attending the orientation meeting could then 
apply by completing and mailing a form with questions on demographics, work 
and business experience, and the individual’s current business or new business idea. 
Applicants were informed that “GATE does not have space for everyone” and that 
a “lottery or random drawing will decide whether you will be able to enter the pro-
gram.” This would not necessarily be perceived as unusual, as training providers 
often face capacity constraints.
Program coordinators randomized applicants to treatment or control with equal 
probability (we confirm balance on baseline observables in Section IIE). Program 
administrators for each training provider then offered treatment applicants a stan-
dard array of free training services (Section IIB), told control applicants that the 
GATE program did not have the capacity to offer them services, and did not offer 
control applicants referrals to any other services. Individuals in both treatment and 
control groups were notified that they would be mailed follow-up surveys.
GATE is the largest-ever randomized evaluation of entrepreneurship training 
and assistance, with 4,197 individuals randomized at baseline.
7 See http://www.doleta.gov/projectgate/ for more information. 
8 Training providers marketed GATE through several channels: online; on-site electronic kiosks, merchandising, 
and paper materials; direct mail (insert with UI checks); mass media; and referral networks with community-based 
organizations. 
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B. Services Provided and the External Validity of the Training “Treatment”
GATE training providers were chosen with a goal of (not quantitatively deter-
mined) representativeness of the subsidized training market.9 Fourteen organi-
zations from seven different sites participated in the GATE study, with a mix of 
SBA-funded Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) and nonprofit com-
munity-based organizations (CBOs) in both urban and rural locations. The 14 
participating  providers deliver services in and around Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; 
Minneapolis/St.  Paul; Duluth, Minnesota; Virginia, Minnesota; Portland, Maine; 
Lewiston, Maine; and Bangor, Maine (see Bellotti, McConnell, and Benus 2006 
for more details). SBDCs and CBOs offer similar services, as detailed below, but 
differ somewhat in their stated goals. The SBDCs tend to emphasize helping small 
business owners grow (or start) their businesses to contribute to the local econ-
omy, whereas the CBOs tend to emphasize small business ownership as a path to 
 self-sufficiency. Both types of organizations employ experienced business consul-
tants to deliver one-on-one and group trainings.
Eighty-nine percent of the treatment group actually received some training during 
the evaluation horizon, with 81 percent getting training within 6 months of enter-
ing the study. GATE training was  customized for the individual from an array of 
services offered by the  provider, as is typical in the subsidized market.10 Training 
began with a one-on-one assessment to produce a service plan that typically com-
bined one-on-one services with selected group services. Sixty-four percent of treat-
ment group individuals then received one-on-one counseling/consulting that was 
customized to the individual’s experience, capabilities, circumstances, and oppor-
tunities.  Seventy-seven percent of the treatment group received classroom/group 
training(s). These targeted a variety of general and specialized topics at different 
experience levels. Introductory workshops covered subjects such as legal structure, 
business plans, and marketing. Intermediate and advanced group trainings covered 
subjects including managing growth, obtaining financing, legal risks, and personnel 
issues. More specialized group trainings covered topics such as accounting, infor-
mation technology, and web-based businesses. Benus et al. (2009) estimate that the 
total cost of providing training to GATE recipients is $1,321 per person.
C. Data and Design Limitations Preclude  
Unpacking Heterogeneity in Training content/Delivery
Study limitations preclude identifying any heterogeneous effects for differ-
ent types of training content or providers. Training content was not randomized: 
each member of the treatment group was offered a one-on-one assessment and was 
9 For small businesses at least, casual empiricism suggests that the subsidized market is larger than the 
 nonsubsidized market. For example, on September 3, 2013 the top three Google links for “small business training” 
were all SBA-related, while the fourth link was to the General Services Administration (the federal government’s 
procurement agency), which also provides subsidized training. 
10 For example, the SBA describes SBDCs as providing “…extensive, one-on-one, long-term profes-
sional business advising, low-cost training and other specialized services” (http://www.sba.gov/content/small- 
business-development-centers-sbdcs). 
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advised of a menu of services, as described directly above. Training provider iden-
tities are suppressed in the data for confidentiality reasons; the only related infor-
mation we observe is the proportion of study participants in different “sites” (which 
are aggregated to Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Duluth/Virginia, 
Minnesota, and Maine in the microdata), and whether participating providers in 
these sites were SBDCs and/or CBOs (Bellotti, McConnell, and Benus 2006).11
D. Study Participant characteristics and External Validity of the Sample
GATE was designed to estimate treatment effects on recipients who are represen-
tative of those served by subsidized training providers. GATE services, like most 
subsidized training programs in the United States, were marketed to any individual 
interested in starting or growing a business.12
What do subsidized training recipients look like, typically? We are not aware of any 
(other) nationally representative data on the characteristics of training entrants, but 
data sources on self-employment entrants suggest that we should expect to find high 
rates of unemployment at our baseline sample, since both voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment are strongly associated with subsequent entry into self-employment 
(Farber 1999; Parker 2009; Krashinsky 2005; Fairlie and Krashinsky 2012; Fairlie 
2013).13 It is thus reassuring to find that 55 percent of our sample is unemployed at 
baseline, with 39 percent receiving unemployment insurance (Table 1).
Returning to the full GATE sample, Table 1 describes several other baseline 
characteristics (besides employment status) that we use below to test for treatment 
effects in subsamples motivated by various rationales for subsidizing training. Much 
of the sample plausibly faces credit constraints, with 44  percent reporting a bad 
credit history14 and many belonging to groups thought to be subject to labor mar-
ket discrimination (46 percent are females, and nearly 50 percent are minorities). 
A majority of the sample plausibly lacks specific human capital, with 19 percent 
of participants already self-employed and 32  percent of participants having ever 
worked for relatives or friends who were self-employed.
In all, the available data suggests that GATE succeeded in obtaining a representa-
tive sample of subsidized training recipients, and that various subgroups of particu-
lar interest are also well-represented.
11 We use this information to infer that GATE service delivery in the Pittsburgh and Duluth areas was dominated 
by SBDC providers, with the Philadelphia area served entirely by CBOs. Treatment effect estimates for these two 
subsamples are similar to those for the full sample (Appendix Tables 1A and 1B), although the small subsample 
sizes produce wide confidence intervals that do not rule out big differences across the different areas/provider types. 
12 Some smaller-scale programs target recipients of social insurance. Demonstration programs in Washington 
and Massachusetts starting in 1989, and Self-Employment Assistance programs in several states starting in 1993, 
targeted unemployment insurance recipients and provided concurrent UI benefits or lump sum payments (which 
also exists in Europe, e.g., Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008). The Self-Employment Investment Demonstration, 
implemented from 1988 to 1992 in five states, targeted AFDC recipients. 
13 Involuntary employment may be a spur to occupation change, and voluntary employment may be an optimal 
step along a transition path to self-employment if starting a business and/or obtaining training is time-consuming. 
14 A large percentage of the sample might also lack collateralizable wealth given the prevalence of modest 
incomes (33 percent < $50,000 annual household income). 
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E. randomization integrity and Differential Attrition
Table 1 checks for treatment versus control balance on characteristics at the base-
line and at each of the three follow-ups (sample composition changes over time due 
to attrition). Random assignment was not stratified by site, but the top rows show 
that each site produced roughly 50–50 assignments nevertheless (columns 1–3). 
Among the numerous baseline characteristics measured in the application, only age 
is statistically different between treatment and control. One would expect to find 
one or two significant differences by chance, and the magnitude of the age differ-
ence is small (< 1 year). In any case, when estimating treatment effects we present 
results both without covariates as well as with controls for a large set of detailed 
baseline characteristics.
Table 1—Treatment/Control Comparison of Characteristics for GATE Experiment













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Philadelphia 28.7% 27.5% 0.40 26.8% 25.6% 0.43
Pittsburgh 13.8% 14.6% 0.43 13.7% 14.3% 0.58
Minneapolis-St. Paul 39.8% 39.0% 0.58 41.1% 39.1% 0.24
Duluth 4.6% 5.0% 0.54 4.6% 5.1% 0.51
Maine 13.1% 13.9% 0.48 13.9% 15.9% 0.09
Female 47.2% 45.7% 0.32 48.5% 46.4% 0.22
Black 30.5% 30.6% 0.91 29.1% 29.8% 0.65
Latino 6.2% 5.1% 0.12 6.3% 4.9% 0.09
Asian 4.6% 4.5% 0.86 3.8% 3.3% 0.42
Other 7.9% 8.1% 0.80 7.7% 7.6% 0.91
Not US born 10.0% 10.2% 0.83 8.9% 9.2% 0.81
Age 42.08 42.77 0.03 42.73 43.42 0.04
Married 48.1% 48.4% 0.81 49.4% 48.6% 0.64
Has children 46.7% 46.1% 0.68 45.4% 45.1% 0.88
Highest grade completed 14.39 14.52 0.07 14.53 14.61 0.28
HH Income $25,000– 49,999 32.6% 33.7% 0.46 33.0% 34.0% 0.56
HH Income $50,000–74,999 17.9% 17.2% 0.55 18.5% 17.5% 0.45
HH Income $75,000–99,999 6.9% 7.2% 0.70 7.1% 7.2% 0.91
HH Income $100,000+ 6.3% 7.0% 0.31 6.9% 7.4% 0.56
Self-emp. at application 18.3% 19.5% 0.33 19.3% 20.4% 0.41
Has a health problem 8.7% 8.3% 0.63 9.0% 8.9% 0.90
Has relatives or friends who
 have been previously S.E.
70.3% 70.4% 0.93 71.7% 72.0% 0.85
Ever worked for relatives
 or friends who are S.E.
31.7% 32.0% 0.81 31.7% 31.8% 0.96
Has a bad credit history 45.4% 43.9% 0.34 43.3% 43.2% 0.94
Currently receiving UI benefits 39.9% 38.1% 0.24 41.1% 39.7% 0.40
Has health insurance from
 current employer
16.8% 18.1% 0.26 16.6% 17.5% 0.48
Autonomy index 1.7% −1.7% 0.27 −1.1% −1.9% 0.81
Risk tolerance index −0.2% 0.2% 0.87 2.6% −1.1% 0.27
Unemployed at application 55.3% 55.4% 0.92 55.0% 55.5% 0.78
F-test for all variables 0.56 0.53
Sample size 2,094 2,103 1,758 1,691
Percent of baseline sample 100.0% 100.0% 84.0% 80.4% 0.003
(continued)
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Table 1 also compares treatment and control completion rates and baseline char-
acteristics for each of the three follow-up surveys. The bottom row shows that con-
trol group members are significantly more likely to attrit: the completion rate differs 
by 4–5 percentage points, on a base of 56–80 percent, for each follow-up wave. 
However, despite differential attrition rates overall, we do not find differences in the 
observable composition of the treatment versus control groups, based on character-
istics observed in the baseline. The number of significant differences is about what 
one would expect to find by chance, and the magnitude of these differences is small. 
More formally, in a regression of follow-up survey completion on baseline char-
acteristics, treatment status, and baseline characteristics interacted with treatment 
Table 1—Treatment/Control Comparison of Characteristics for GATE Experiment (continued)













  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Philadelphia 25.1% 24.0% 0.49 23.1% 22.0% 0.53
Pittsburgh 14.0% 14.2% 0.82 14.5% 14.4% 0.92
Minneapolis-St. Paul 42.3% 40.4% 0.29 43.9% 42.0% 0.35
Duluth 4.7% 5.1% 0.60 5.0% 4.9% 0.99
Maine 14.0% 16.3% 0.08 13.6% 16.7% 0.03
Female 48.8% 46.9% 0.31 48.1% 47.1% 0.62
Black 27.6% 28.3% 0.69 25.3% 26.0% 0.70
Latino 6.4% 5.1% 0.12 6.4% 5.2% 0.19
Asian 3.3% 2.9% 0.52 3.1% 2.8% 0.71
Other 7.4% 7.0% 0.64 7.4% 6.6% 0.47
Not US born 8.3% 8.7% 0.67 7.1% 8.1% 0.34
Age 43.16 43.81 0.07 43.91 44.16 0.54
Married 50.2% 49.0% 0.54 51.4% 49.6% 0.38
Has children 45.4% 44.6% 0.69 44.0% 42.8% 0.58
Highest grade completed 14.59 14.66 0.38 14.75 14.78 0.77
HH Income $25,000– 49,999 32.9% 33.4% 0.77 31.9% 34.5% 0.18
HH Income $50,000–74,999 19.2% 17.8% 0.31 20.1% 17.2% 0.06
HH Income $75,000–99,999 7.4% 7.3% 0.92 8.1% 7.4% 0.53
HH Income $100,000+ 7.5% 8.0% 0.59 8.8% 8.9% 0.96
Self-emp. at application 19.8% 21.2% 0.34 20.3% 21.5% 0.48
Has a health problem 9.1% 8.9% 0.85 8.9% 8.4% 0.69
Has relatives or friends who
 have been previously S.E.
72.9% 72.5% 0.81 73.6% 73.1% 0.78
Ever worked for relatives
 or friends who are S.E.
31.6% 31.7% 0.97 30.9% 31.5% 0.77
Has a bad credit history 41.8% 41.5% 0.87 38.9% 39.4% 0.79
Currently receiving UI benefits 42.1% 39.3% 0.12 43.0% 41.1% 0.35
Has health insurance from
 current employer
16.6% 17.6% 0.46 16.8% 17.1% 0.84
Autonomy index −0.7% −1.7% 0.79 −2.0% −4.9% 0.49
Risk tolerance index 1.3% −2.0% 0.34 −0.7% −4.4% 0.35
Unemployed at application 55.5% 54.6% 0.63 55.8% 55.4% 0.85
F-test for all variables 0.69 0.80
Sample size 1,563 1,475 1,274 1,176
Percent of baseline sample 74.6% 70.1% 0.001 60.8% 55.9% 0.001
notes: All reported characteristics are measured at time of application, prior to random assignment. The wave 1, 
wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. The autonomy index is 
created from standardizing responses on a scale of 1 to 5 to whether the statement “I enjoy working independently” 
is true about themself. The risk aversion index is created from combining standardized responses to “I’m only will-
ing to take a risk if I am sure everything will work out” and “I am not prepared to risk my savings for my business.”
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status, the F-tests on the interaction variable coefficients have p-values of 0.214 for 
Wave 1, 0.823 for Wave 2, and 0.091 for Wave 3. Despite this reassurance, we inves-
tigate how treatment effects might be biased if there is in fact differential attrition 
(e.g., on unobservables) in Section IIIF.
F. Empirical Strategy
Our main specification for estimating average treatment effects on outcomes 
focuses on estimating the effects of receiving entrepreneurship training (i.e., local 
average treatment effects) instead of estimating the effects of being offered free 
entrepreneurship training (i.e., “intent-to-treat” effects). We estimate first-stage 
OLS regressions of the form
(1)  E it = ω + γ X ib + π T ib +  u it . 
Where E measures whether individual i had obtained any training by follow-up 
survey t,15  X ib is a vector of the baseline covariates (indexed by b for “baseline”) 
reported in Table 1, and  T ib = 1 if i was assigned to the treatment group. The 
 second-stage regression for an outcome of interest y, measured for individual i at 
time t, is then
(2)  y it = α + β X ib + Δ E ˆ it +  ε it ,
where  E ˆ it is the predicted likelihood of training receipt and  u it and  ε it are error 
terms. Δ provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE). When 
 estimating heterogeneous treatment effects we add interactions between baseline 
covariates and treatment assignment to the equation (2).
II. The First Stage: How Powerful Is the Experimental Treatment?
A. Effects on Total Training Quantity and Quality
Given that the control group was not restricted from obtaining training elsewhere, 
it is important to examine whether and how the GATE treatment actually changed 
the use of training services. If each member of the control group simply obtains 
 services elsewhere, or obtains better-quality services elsewhere, then the experimen-
tal design will not identify the causal effects of (subsidized) training. We consider 
both quantitative and qualitative effects of GATE’s random assignment on the total-
ity of training received by individuals in the study.
Starting with the quantity of training received, Table 2, column 1 shows that the 
treatment group is an estimated 37 percentage points more likely (81 percent ver-
sus 44  percent) to receive any training by Wave 1 (6 months following random 
15 We also estimate first-stage relationships between treatment assignment and intensive margins of training 
receipt (see Section III). Note that we only have one instrument and hence cannot separately identify effects on 
extensive and intensive margins. 
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assignment) than the control group.16 The treatment group also received more than 
twice the number of hours of training by Wave 1: 15.6 versus 6.6 (column 2).17 
Cumulating across waves, the treatment group was 23 percentage points more likely 
to receive any training (column 9) and received 8.5 more hours (column 10).
Can a difference of 8.5–9 hours of training reasonably be expected to affect 
business outcomes? We believe the answer is yes, for several reasons. First, the 
8.5–9 hour differential only measures training time, not any “homework multiplier” 
(see, e.g., Table 3 for a big treatment effect on business planning). If we were to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a standard five-credit college course, for example, we 
would not think of any treatment effects as working merely through the 30 or so 
hours of instructional time. Nor would we think of the impact of preventative med-
ical care as working merely through the few hours (or minutes) of office visits; 
rather, it is the provision of key bits of information, and how recipients then apply 
that information in their daily lives (and/or businesses), that is important. Second, 
16 Examining who receives entrepreneurship training, we find only a few characteristics that predict take-up 
of training by each follow-up wave. Focusing on the main effects we find some evidence that African Americans 
and the more educated are more likely to receive training (see Appendix Table 2). Examining differential take up 
between the treatment and control groups, we find only a few significant differences. F-tests for differential take 
up for all covariates do not reject equality in any of the three follow-up waves. Unfortunately, no information was 
gathered at baseline on whether participants ever received training prior to random assignment. 
17 The levels and differences in training receipt are similar across program sites. 
Table 2—Treatment and Control Groups Receipt of Entrepreneurship Training
R.A. to wave 1
(6 month period)
Wave 1 to wave 2 
(12 month period)














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment group
Any entrepreneurship training 81.2% 15.6 41.5% 7.3 26.1% 4.6
Attended classes,
 workshops or seminars
66.8% 13.8 35.0% 6.6 22.1% 4.0
Counseling 52.5% 1.8 18.0% 0.8 10.0% 0.6
 or technical assistance
control group
Any entrepreneurship training 44.0% 6.6 37.9% 6.7 28.7% 5.7
Attended classes,
 workshops or seminars
37.7% 5.8 32.7% 6.1 25.1% 5.2
Counseling 19.2% 0.9 13.8% 0.7 10.3% 0.6
 or technical assistance
Treatment-control difference and (standard error)
Any entrepreneurship training 0.372 8.99 0.036 0.63 −0.026 −1.10
(0.015) (0.72) (0.018) (0.73) (0.018) (0.71)
Attended classes, workshops 0.290 7.97 0.024 0.50 −0.030 −1.15
 or seminars (0.016) (0.68) (0.017) (0.68) (0.017) (0.68)
Counseling 0.333 0.99 0.043 0.10 −0.003 0.05
 or technical assistance (0.015) (0.15) (0.013) (0.11) (0.012) (0.17)
(continued )
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the limited available prior evidence suggests that just a few hours of training can 
be impactful (Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014).18 Third, casual empiricism rein-
forces the notion that the first few hours of training or advice might be the most 
impactful; after all, many board members and advisors of small companies only 
provide a handful of hours of advice or training each quarter.
Returning to Table 2, note also that the cumulative differences in training hours 
are driven by the Wave 1 effects; this is unsurprising, given that the sample is 
 comprised of people with demand for training at the time of random assignment. 
We would only expect to find differences in training obtained at later horizons if 
there is strong complementarity between training obtained in the short-run (between 
 random assignment and Wave 1 follow-up) and training obtained later (between 
Wave 1 and Wave 2, and/or between Wave 2 and Wave 3).
Can short-run differences in training generate longer-run differences in business 
outcomes? In other words, is it reasonable to expect that training, if effective, will 
produce differences in business outcomes at Wave 2 and Wave 3, given that training 
receipt only differs at Wave 1? Yes, if training is an upfront investment (in human 
capital) that produces a flow of returns into the future.
Table 2 and Appendix Table 3 also report evidence on how treatment assignment 
affects the type/quality of training received. The results suggest that an individual in 
18 This evidence is from a different setting (microcredit users in the Dominican Republic), and its external 
validity to our setting is uncertain. 
Table 2—Treatment and Control Groups Receipt 













(7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment group
Any entrepreneurship training 86.4% 22.9 88.7% 27.6
Attended classes, workshops, or seminars 74.1% 20.4 77.0% 24.4
Received one-on-one counseling 58.8% 2.6 63.7% 3.3
 or technical assistance
control group
Any entrepreneurship training 57.3% 13.3 65.4% 19.1
Attended classes, workshops, or seminars 50.6% 11.9 58.7% 17.1
Received one-on-one counseling 27.9% 1.5 34.4% 2.1
 or technical assistance
Treatment-control difference and (standard error)
Any entrepreneurship training 0.291 9.62 0.232 8.52
(0.016) (1.15) (0.017) (1.53)
Attended classes, workshops or seminars 0.235 8.47 0.183 7.31
(0.017) (1.08) (0.019) (1.38)
Received one-on-one counseling 0.310 1.09 0.293 1.14
 or technical assistance (0.017) (0.21) (0.019) (0.30)
notes: The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after 
time of application.
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the treatment group is far more likely to obtain customized training; e.g., 30 percent-
age points more likely to receive one-on-one assistance (Table 2), and 16 percentage 
points more likely to receive help refining their business idea (Appendix Table 3). 
Appendix Table 3 also suggests that treatment group respondents found the train-
ing to be high-quality, with 52 percent of recipients reporting it “very useful” and 
34 percent “somewhat useful.” The comparable proportions for those in the control 
group who obtained any training are 36 percent and 41 percent. Appendix Table 3 
also reports treatment and control group responses to questions about whether train-
ing helped with 12 specific aspects of business planning and operation. (The sample 
is again comprised of training recipients only). The treatment group is more likely 
to respond that training was helpful for each of the 12 aspects.
In all, the evidence suggests that the experiment produced training in substan-
tially greater quantity and quality for treatment relative to control individuals. 
Hence, any null effects are likely due to training that is ineffective per se, rather than 
to a low-powered identification strategy.
B. Effects on Business Planning and Loan Applications
Table 3 shows that GATE affected some business planning and practice outcomes 
as well. Treated individuals were 13 percentage points more likely to have written a 
business plan by Wave 1, and this difference persists over time. We do not find any 
differences in loan applications, however, on a low base; e.g., only 6 percent of the 
treatment and control groups applied for a business loan by Wave 1.19
III. The Effects of Entrepreneurship Training on More Ultimate Outcomes
A. Average Effects on Business ownership
Table 4 reports estimates of the IV specification in equation (2).20 Results with 
and without controls for baseline covariates are similar, and our discussions below 
focus on the former (column 2). The average impact of entrepreneurship training 
on business ownership at Wave 1 (the six-month follow-up) is large and signifi-
cant: 13.4  percentage points on a base (control group mean) of 35.9 percent. At 
the 18-month follow-up, the treatment effect point estimate remains positive, but 
the difference is smaller (6.9 percentage points on a base of 40.9 percent) and no 
longer statistically significant. Sixty months after random assignment, the treat-
ment and control groups have nearly identical levels of business ownership.21 These 
results are not driven by changes in sample composition: we get similar results after 
restricting the sample to Wave 3 respondents. In all, the results in this first panel 
19 Only 7 GATE participants obtained SBA-backed loans in Wave 1 and 11 in Wave 3. 
20 The ITT estimates are reported in Appendix Table 4 for the main outcomes reported in Table 4. As expected 
given the noncompliance rates, the point estimates are generally scaled down by a factor of 2 to 3 relative to the 
LATE estimates reported in Table 4. None of our statistical inferences change. Because most of the LATE estimates 
are close to zero, the “scaled down” ITT estimates also tend to be close to zero. 
21 We also find very similar average total number of businesses owned between the treatment and control groups 
over the 60-month sample period. 
VoL. 7 no. 2 137Fairlie et al.: Behind the Gate experiment
suggest that the positive short-term effects of entrepreneurship training on business 
ownership fade over time.22
Before examining additional outcomes in Table 4, we briefly examine the effects 
of entrepreneurship training on the dynamics of business entry and exit in Appendix 
Table 5. Given that the treatment and control groups start with roughly equal own-
ership rates (Table 1), any differences in business ownership rates at each of the 
follow-up survey waves are due to differences in business creation rates, differences 
in business exit rates, or both.23 The second panel of Appendix Table 5 shows that, 
conditional on not owning a business at baseline, treatment group members were 
far more likely to have started a business six months later. This effect dissipates 
over time. The third panel of Appendix Table 5 shows that, conditional on owning 
a business at baseline, there are no statistically significant differences in exit rates, 
although the point estimates are all large and negative.
Overall, the estimates indicate that entrepreneurship training increased average 
levels of business ownership in the short-run. Entrepreneurship training appears to 
have drawn new people into starting businesses but did not significantly increase the 
survival rates of preexisting businesses.24
22 The results are not due to the influence of side or casual businesses, or disguised unemployment (Carter and 
Sutch 1994). Defining business ownership with 30 or more hours worked per week, we find lower rates of business 
ownership, but similar treatment-control differences. We also restrict business ownership to only include businesses 
reporting positive sales at each survey wave to remove nonserious self-employment activities. Again, we find sim-
ilar results. 
23 See, Evans and Leighton (1989); Fairlie (1999); and Carrasco (1999) for more discussion and empirical 
estimates of the relationships between self-employment entry, exit and steady-state rates. 
24 Using information on start and stop dates for all businesses owned between survey dates, we find no evidence 
of treatment effects on total length of time of business ownership .
Table 3—Treatment-Control Differences in Business Practices
Treatment-control
Treatment Obs. Control Obs. No covars Covariates
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wrote a business plan by W1 0.5000 1,752 0.3725 1,686 0.1275 0.1276
(0.0168) (0.0172)
Wrote a business plan by W2 0.5974 1,555 0.4666 1,468 0.1308 0.1296
(0.0180) (0.0185)
Wrote a business plan by W3 0.6761 1,266 0.5662 1,171 0.1100 0.1108
(0.0196) (0.0200)
Applied for a business loan by W1 0.0592 1,756 0.0627 1,691 −0.0035 −0.0035
(0.0082) (0.0084)
Applied for a business loan by W2 0.0962 1,560 0.0916 1,473 0.0045 0.0008
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Applied for a business loan by W3 0.1457 1,270 0.1549 1,175 −0.0092 −0.0152
(0.0145) (0.0150)
notes: The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. 
Treatment-control differences with covariates are estimated from a linear probability model that controls for pro-
gram sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at 
application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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B. Effects on Business Scale: Sales and Employees
The dynamics of results on business ownership imply that the marginal busi-
nesses produced by entrepreneurship training do not survive in the medium/ 
long-run. Indeed, examining the average treatment effects on business sales and 
hiring employees, we find no significant effects at any horizon, suggesting that the 
marginal businesses had low levels of sales and generally did not hire employees 
(Table 4). Note that these results do not condition on business ownership, and thus 
capture the treatment’s overall impact on sales and hiring employees.
The results for employment do not differ when we change the focus from having 
an employee to the number of employees (Appendix Table 6). Appendix Table 7 
shows the lack of treatment effects on business structure; e.g., on incorporation, or 
on having a business located outside the home.
Table 4—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training  
on Business Ownership and Main Outcomes
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.1252 0.1337 3,443
(0.0446) (0.0395)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0742 0.0691 3,032
(0.0616) (0.0570)
Business owner at W3 survey date 0.0406 0.0105 2,446
(0.0844) (0.0810)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date (000s) −1.0817 −0.9402 3,210
(0.7510) (0.7336)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date (000s) −0.6060 −0.4411 2,794
(1.1539) (1.1151)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date (000s) −2.0977 −2.5522 2,323
(2.2804) (2.2885)
Has any employees at W1 survey date 0.0353 0.0363 3,438
(0.0248) (0.0245)
Has any employees at W2 survey date 0.0133 0.0065 3,023
(0.0368) (0.0362)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.0736 −0.0871 2,436
(0.0525) (0.0534)
log household income at W1 −0.0636 −0.0223 3,223
(0.0848) (0.0639)
log household income at W2 0.1191 0.0635 2,797
(0.1203) (0.0953)
log household income at W3 0.2346 0.0915 2,270
(0.1799) (0.1485)
notes: The first-stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on 
treatment. The second-stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneur-
ship training. The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months 
after time of application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, mar-
ried, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health prob-
lems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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Do these average treatment effects obscure important effects on the firm size dis-
tribution? Table 5 suggests not, focusing on sales and employment at the 60-month 
follow-up. Column 2 (5) shows sales and employment for treatment group (control 
group) businesses, and column 3 (6) shows sales and employment for treatment 
group (control group) businesses created during the study period (we also report the 
unconditional distributions for all individuals in the treatment and control groups 
in columns 1 and 4 that are relevant for estimating treatment impacts). Comparing 
columns 2 and 5 to column 7, our sample has fewer large businesses than the United 
Stagtes as a whole. This is partly due to the five-year study period: the distributions 
are more similar when we compare businesses created in the past five years (col-
umns 3, 6, and 8). Focusing on the treatment versus control comparisons, we do not 
find that businesses created by the treatment group are more likely to be successful 
than businesses created by the control group. In fact, we find that a higher per-
centage of businesses owned by the control group have sales of $500,000 or more. 
χ2 tests show that the full treatment and control distributions are not significantly 
different from each other (column 1 versus column 4).25
25 We also estimate regressions for the probability of creating businesses at various cutoffs above $100,000 and 
10 employees using the full Wave 3 sample. We find no treatment effects at any of these cutoffs. We also estimate 
quantile regressions for sales and employees starting with the seventy-fifth percentile and incrementing up by 5 per-
centile points to the ninety-fifth percentile. Again, we find no evidence of treatment effects at any of these quantiles. 
Overall, we do not find evidence that entrepreneurship training increased the likelihood of creating high-revenue or 
high- employment firms five years post-random assignment. 
Table 5—Distribution of Businesses by Annual Sales and Number of Employees  
at Wave 3 for Treatment Group, Control Group, and US Total















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Annual sales and receipts
No business 61.1% NA NA 62.1% NA NA NA NA
Less than $5,000 9.7% 24.9% 26.6% 8.9% 23.5% 23.5% 20.6% 22.4%
$5,000 to $9,999 3.8% 9.7% 10.1% 5.0% 13.1% 12.8% 13.7% 13.8%
$10,000 to $24,999 6.5% 16.6% 13.0% 6.8% 18.0% 17.5% 18.8% 18.6%
$25,000 to $49,999 6.7% 17.3% 18.0% 4.6% 12.0% 13.7% 12.1% 12.9%
$50,000 to $99,999 5.6% 14.3% 12.6% 5.7% 15.1% 14.1% 9.9% 10.7%
$100,000 to $249,999 4.5% 11.5% 13.0% 3.8% 9.9% 11.1% 10.2% 10.6%
$250,000 to $499,999 1.5% 3.9% 4.7% 1.6% 4.2% 3.4% 5.5% 5.0%
$500,000 to $999,999 0.4% 0.9% 1.1% 0.7% 1.8% 1.7% 4.0% 3.2%
$1,000,000 or more 0.4% 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 2.4% 2.1% 5.2% 3.0%
Employment size
No business 61.1% NA NA 62.1% NA NA NA NA
No employees 29.5% 75.9% 74.0% 26.8% 70.8% 72.2% 81.1% 85.0%
1 to 4 employees 7.2% 18.6% 20.0% 8.6% 22.7% 22.0% 10.6% 10.0%
5 to 9 employees 1.2% 3.1% 3.8% 1.3% 3.4% 2.2% 3.7% 2.6%
10 to 19 employees 0.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.3% 1.4%
20 to 49 employees 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 1.4% 0.8%
50 to 99 employees 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2%
100 employees or more 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%
Sample size 1,116 434 278 1,009 383 234    
notes: United States total is from the Survey of Business Owners 2007, US Census Bureau, and includes all nonfarm businesses with 
sales of at least $1,000 in 2007. New businesses are individuals who did not own a business at the time of application to the program.
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C. Average Effects on Earnings: Business and Household
Training could make businesses more productive even if they do not grow in scale, 
so we also examine impacts on earnings. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows key 
summary results: there are no significant effects of training on household income at 
any horizon, although the confidence intervals include large effects in both direc-
tions.26 Appendix Table 6 unpacks this result by looking at treatment effects on 
overall employment (wage/salary work or business ownership) and on business 
performance measured in various ways.27 We find no evidence of positive effects 
on business  performance; in fact, the point estimates tend to be negative. Appendix 
Table 8 offers some reassurance that these results are not driven by bias in respond-
ing to sensitive or difficult questions on earnings: it shows that item nonresponse 
for various income measures (and the business sales measure) is not correlated with 
treatment status.
D. nonpecuniary Benefits? Average Effects on Work Satisfaction
We also investigate the effects of entrepreneurship training on work satisfaction 
(which we use as a proxy for potential nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment)28 
and find no evidence of significant effects (Appendix Table 6).
E. correlations between Entrepreneurship Training and outcomes in control Group
Appendix Table 9 highlights the value of random assignment by providing non-
experimental estimates of the “effects” of training. These regressions use only 
the control group sample, and control for the rich set of baseline characteristics 
reported in Table 1. The correlations between training receipt and subsequent out-
comes in Appendix Table 9 are much larger and more likely to be significant than 
the treatment effects in Table 4. Even a rich set of controls—baseline household 
income level, self-employment status, health problems, work experience in a fam-
ily business, credit history, unemployment insurance receipt, employer-provided 
health insurance, personality traits, and other standard demographic controls— 
cannot purge non-experimental treatment effect estimates of strong upward selec-
tion bias.
F. Exploring the impact of Differential Attrition on the Estimates
Although we do not find strong evidence of differential attrition based on observ-
ables in Section IIE, nor evidence that treatment effect estimates are sensitive to 
26 We also estimate treatment effects on total earnings by combining separately reported business earnings and 
wage/salary earnings (as opposed to direct reports of total household income). We do not find any significant treat-
ment effects on this measure, nor do we find any significant effects on reliance on public assistance. 
27 The follow-up surveys provide information on (i) how much the owner paid him/herself in regular salary 
from the business; (ii) how much the owner received in other income payments, such as bonuses, profit distribu-
tions, or owner’s draw from the business; and (iii) business revenues and expenses. Information is also available on 
the start and stop dates of all of the businesses owned between each survey wave. 
28 See, for example, Hamilton (2000) and Kawaguchi (2004). 
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the inclusion of controls for baseline characteristics (Table 4), follow-up survey 
response rates are higher in the treatment group for each of the follow-up waves, 
raising the concern that attrition may be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity 
in outcomes as well. To investigate whether differential attrition might have a large 
effect on the results, we use two different approaches. First, we estimate regres-
sions for our main set of outcomes using the predicted probability of attrition as a 
sample weight. The full set of baseline controls are used to estimate these predicted 
 probabilities. This technique places more weight on survivors who look like attrit-
ers, in an attempt to compensate for the attriters’ absence. The estimates are robust 
to using these weights (Table 6 versus Table 4).
Second, we conduct a bounds analysis using various assumptions about the treat-
ment effects for attriters, in the spirit of Horowitz and Manski (2000) and Lee (2002; 
2009). Table 7, column 4 reproduces the relevant average treatment effect estimate 
from Table 4. Following Kling et al. (2007) and Karlan and Valdivia (2011), we 
Table 6—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training on Main Outcomes  
Weighted by Predicted Nonresponse Probabilities
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.0977 0.1141 3,443
(0.0491) (0.0425)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0397 0.0689 3,032
(0.0678) (0.0607)
Business owner at W3 survey date −0.0634 −0.0599 2,446
(0.0928) (0.0870)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date −1,525 −1,265 3,210
(883) (807)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date −607 −400 2,794
(1,244) (1,186)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date −2,868 −2,651 2,323
(2,267) (2,152)
Has any employees at W1 survey date 0.0234 0.0263 3,438
(0.0269) (0.0252)
Has any employees at W2 survey date −0.0003 0.0007 3,023
(0.0403) (0.0379)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.0739 −0.0794 2,436
(0.0603) (0.0580)
log household income at W1 −0.0419 0.0002 3,223
(0.0989) (0.0751)
log household income at W2 0.1065 0.0561 2,797
(0.1350) (0.1084)
log household income at W3 0.2617 0.1506 2,270
(0.1947) (0.1638)
notes: The first-stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on 
treatment. The second-stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneur-
ship training. The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months 
after time of application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, mar-
ried, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health prob-
lems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. Sample weights used to estimate 
treatment-control differences are predicted probabilities of nonresponse in specified wave from 
first-stage regression using all covariates.
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impute to the lower (upper) bound the mean minus (plus) a specified standard 
 deviation multiple of the observed treatment group distribution to the  nonresponders 
in the treatment group, and the mean plus (minus) the same standard deviation 
multiple of the observed control group distribution to nonresponders in the control 
group. In column 3, for example, we create a conservative treatment effect estimate 
by assuming that treatment group attriters have the mean value for the dependent 
variable minus 0.05 standard deviations among nonattriting treatment observations, 
and that the control group attriters have the mean value for the dependent variable 
plus 0.05 standard deviations among the nonattriting control observations.
Table 7 indicates that the results are not overly sensitive to adding and sub-
tracting 0.05 standard deviations from the means, but are sensitive to moving 0.25 
standard deviations from the means (columns 1 and 7). To put the magnitudes of 
these changes in perspective, Table 7 also reports the control and treatment standard 
 deviations in column 8 (the treatment and control means are reported in Table 4). 
For business  ownership at Wave 1, for example, the −0.05 adjustment reported in 
column 4 assumes that the attriting treatment group has a 2.5 percentage point lower 
business ownership rate than the nonattriting treatment sample, and that the attriting 
Table 7—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training on Main Outcomes: Bounds Analysis
Standard 
deviation
Lower bounds Upper bounds
Control/
treatment−0.25 std. −0.10 std. −0.05 std. Unadj. +0.05 std. +0.10 std. +0.25 std.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business owner at
 W1 survey date
0.0218 0.0892 0.1116 0.1337 0.1565 0.1790 0.2463 0.4799
(0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0395) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0332) 0.4911
Business owner at
 W2 survey date
−0.1528 −0.0170 0.0282 0.0691 0.1187 0.1640 0.2997 0.4918
(0.0425) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0570) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0425) 0.4953
Business owner at
 W3 survey date
−0.3921 −0.1384 −0.0539 0.0105 0.1152 0.1998 0.4534 0.4854
(0.0491) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0810) (0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0492) 0.4877
Monthly business sales at
 W1 survey date (000s)
−3.3615 −1.9122 −1.4291 −0.9402 −0.4629 0.0202 1.4695 9.1599
(0.5717) (0.5680) (0.5675) (0.7336) (0.5675) (0.5680) (0.5716) 6.5686
Monthly business sales at
 W2 survey date (000s)
−5.6119 −2.5024 −1.4659 −0.4411 0.6071 1.6436 4.7531 9.7962
(0.7856) (0.7782) (0.7771) (1.1151) (0.7771) (0.7781) (0.7854) 8.8079
Monthly business sales at
 W3 survey date (000s)
−14.2217 −7.0030 −4.5968 −2.5522 0.2157 2.6219 9.8405 13.8608
(1.3269) (1.3126) (1.3106) (2.2885) (1.3108) (1.3131) (1.3282) 11.9129
Has any employees at
 W1 survey date
−0.0254 0.0121 0.0246 0.0363 0.0496 0.0622 0.0997 0.2589
(0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0245) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0201) 0.2793
Has any employees at
 W2 survey date
−0.1250 −0.0434 −0.0162 0.0065 0.0382 0.0654 0.1470 0.2918
(0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0362) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0265) 0.2972
Has any employees at
 W3 survey date
−0.3404 −0.1815 −0.1286 −0.0871 −0.0226 0.0303 0.1892 0.3135
(0.0316) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0534) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0317) 0.2907
log household income
 at W1
−0.2736 −0.1111 −0.0570 −0.0223 0.0513 0.1055 0.2679 0.9111
(0.0541) (0.0536) (0.0535) (0.0639) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0541) 0.8992
log household income
 at W2
−0.3726 −0.0611 0.0428 0.0635 0.2505 0.3543 0.6658 0.9434
(0.0705) (0.0698) (0.0697) (0.0953) (0.0698) (0.0699) (0.0708) 0.9425
log household income
 at W3
−0.7005 −0.1332 0.0558 0.0915 0.4340 0.6230 1.1903 1.0113
(0.0883) (0.0871) (0.0870) (0.1485) (0.0871) (0.0873) (0.0888) 0.9596
notes: See Table 4 for notes and sample sizes. Columns 1 and 7 impute to the lower (upper) bound the mean minus 
(plus) 0.25 standard deviations of the observed treatment distribution to the nonresponders in the treatment group and 
the mean plus (minus) 0.25 standard deviations of the observed control distribution to nonresponders in the control 
group. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 repeat the exercise subtracting and adding the specified standard deviations. Column 4 
(unadjusted) reproduces the estimates reported in Table 4.
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control group has a 2.4 percentage point higher business ownership rate than the 
nonattriting control sample. These are large changes from a base business ownership 
rate of roughly 35 to 40 percent but do not result in major changes in the results.29
If we focus on the disappearance of the 13 percentage point short-run treatment 
effect by the 60-month follow-up survey, we find it would take an extreme form of 
biased attrition to regenerate the treatment effect in the long run. For the treatment 
effect to be 13 percentage points at the 60-month follow-up, it would require the 
attritors in the treatment group to have at least a 0.10 standard deviation higher 
business ownership rate than nonattritors and attritors in the control group to have 
at least a 0.10 standard deviation lower business ownership rate than nonattritors.
Columns 5–7 of Table 7 also show the particular and strong form that attrition 
would need to take to create positive effects on outcomes other than short-run 
 business ownership and employment. It would have to be the case that treatment 
group attritors have substantially more positive treatment effects, and/or that con-
trol group  attritors have substantially more negative treatment effects than nonat-
tritors. In all, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that attrition would have to be 
particularly strongly correlated with treatment effects to change inferences based on 
our main results.
G. comparison to Findings from Evaluation report
Our methodology, results, and inferences differ from the final evaluation report 
delivered to the US Department of Labor (Benus et al. 2009). Methodologically: 
(i) we include additional outcomes beyond those reported in the original evaluation 
report; (ii) we estimate LATE as well as ITT because of noncompliance in both 
treatment and control; (iii) we estimate distributional effects on business sales and 
employment; (iv) we test several hypotheses regarding the rationales for training 
interventions by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects; (v) we do not remove 
observations if the business has a business partnership with another study partici-
pant with the opposite treatment assignment (120 study participants in 56 business 
partnerships); (vi) our treatment effect estimates for business outcomes include 
(as zeros) those without a business; (vii) we address differential attrition between 
the treatment and control groups using bounds analysis rather than weighting; and 
(viii) we do not use a hot-deck procedure to impute missing values for outcome 
measures and instead exclude observations with missing values for the dependent 
variable.
The methodological differences produce different results. The final evaluation 
report finds positive estimates for total business earnings except for Wave 1, and a 
total treatment/control difference of $1,128 from combining all waves (although 
the difference is not statistically significant). Our analysis of the GATE Project data, 
however, provides no evidence of a positive business earnings treatment effect (in 
29 We also estimate bounds using the trimming procedure suggested in Lee (2002; 2009). The estimated range 
is similar to that reported for 0.10 standard deviations for most outcome measures. 
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fact, the point estimates for each wave are negative).30 We also do not find any 
treatment effects on the hiring of employees, which differs from the final evaluation 
report’s conclusion that the program generated additional jobs beyond those of the 
owners. We examined treatment effects on whether any employees are hired, num-
ber of employees and the full distribution of hiring employees, and find no effects.31 
The final evaluation report also notes that businesses created by the treatment group 
had greater longevity than businesses created by the control group. In contrast, we 
do not find evidence that training lowers exit rates or increases likelihoods of being 
in business at follow-up for those who were business owners at baseline, nor do we 
find that training increases the total length of time of business ownership.
The different results lead to different inferences about the (cost-) effectiveness 
of the GATE program. The final evaluation report concludes “that the benefits of 
Project GATE exceed its costs,” 32 and “DOL should initiate a new self-employment 
training program similar to Project GATE in all states.”33 Our findings, both above 
with respect to the average effects of the program and below with respect to groups 
that might be particularly vulnerable to market failures, provide little support for the 
hypotheses that GATE is cost-effective and/or a relatively efficient way to mitigate 
market failure(s).
IV. Hypothesis Testing Based on Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
To shed light on various rationales for training subsidies, we next explore hetero-
geneous treatment effects. We estimate these effects by adding several interactions 
between key baseline characteristics and treatment status to our model of  conditional 
average treatment effects (i.e., we estimate each heterogeneous effect of interest 
conditional on the others). Table 8A reports estimates for our main outcomes. Each 
row presents results from a single regression. We also estimate average treatment 
effects on subsamples of key groups to address the policy question of whether train-
ing benefits targeted groups in level if not relative terms (Table 8B).
Credit/liquidity constraints are one important rationale for training subsidies: con-
straints may prevent potential entrepreneurs from obtaining training, even if training 
is valuable.34 Alternatively, or possibly additionally, training may help  recipients 
relax liquidity constraints by helping them find alternative sources of financing (e.g., 
microlenders, SBA lenders, Community Development Financial Institutions, etc.) 
30 An Appendix table in the final evaluation report sheds some light on the potential causes of the discrepancy. 
It shows that the business earnings treatment effect estimates are sensitive to hot-decking, excluding treatment/
control partnerships, and sample weighting. When each of these procedures is separately removed the positive total 
business earnings estimate becomes noticeably smaller. 
31 The discrepancy here appears to be due to our focus on changes per individual instead of total counts. The 
latter are partly influenced by higher response rates among the treatment group. 
32 The actual estimated benefit/cost to society calculated in the report is −$1,891, but arguments are made 
that underreporting of business earnings could make the estimated positive business earnings effect larger, and that 
higher treatment group job creation (which is not included in the calculation) could improve the final benefit/cost 
estimate (Benus et al. 2009). 
33 The Department of Labor recently funded a new round of GATE programs in three new states and one previ-
ous state “because of the success of the original Project GATE” (US Department of Labor 2010). 
34 See Parker (2009), Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012), and Kerr and Nanda (2011) for recent reviews of the liter-
ature on credit constraints for entrepreneurs. 
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and navigate application processes. Part of the coursework and advising in entre-
preneurship training is devoted to providing information and assistance in finding 
capital. If either of these mechanisms is in play, then we might expect subsidized 
training to have (relatively) strong, positive effects on the credit-constrained, condi-
tional on other characteristics.
Our measure of baseline credit constraints comes from the application question: 
“Do you have any problems with your credit history?” We construct a dummy that 
takes a value of 1 for the 44 percent of the sample that responded “yes,” and either 
interact this dummy with treatment status (Table 8A, column 2) or limit the sample 
to those with credit problems (Table 8B, column 1). We do not find evidence that 
training has positive effects on the credit-constrained: across the two tables we find 
only 1 significant point estimate out of 30 (for business ownership in Wave 1). We 
also estimate whether entrepreneurship training differentially affects the level of 
invested capital in the business for those with credit problems. We do not find any 
evidence that training affects investment, debt, or loan applications, overall or dif-
ferentially for the credit-constrained.
Labor market discrimination is another potential rationale for training subsidies: 
if employers discriminate more than customers, then low-cost training may be a 





























Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business owner at 
 W1 survey date
0.1136 0.0017 −0.0184 −0.0915 0.0125 −0.0901 −0.0030 −0.0066
(0.1010) (0.0746) (0.0535) (0.0708) (0.0781) (0.0747) (0.0781) (0.0814)
Business owner at
 W2 survey date
−0.0119 0.0666 −0.0758 −0.0157 0.0486 0.0431 0.0622 −0.1097
(0.1390) (0.1028) (0.0599) (0.0975) (0.1100) (0.1034) (0.1066) (0.1102)
Business owner at
 W3 survey date
0.1357 −0.0800 −0.0857 0.0405 0.0433 0.1772 −0.0809 −0.0320
(0.1821) (0.1309) (0.0623) (0.1268) (0.1388) (0.1349) (0.1399) (0.1419)
Monthly business sales at
 W1 survey date (000s)
−1.6755 −0.4427 0.4240 0.7087 1.3018 0.0042 −1.0323 −1.0629
(3.5875) (1.2731) (1.0181) (1.3686) (1.6821) (1.3375) (1.9047) (1.5851)
Monthly business sales at
 W2 survey date (000s)
−3.5339 4.9239 0.3104 −1.8620 0.5023 0.6448 2.1767 −1.0231
(5.0097) (2.7786) (0.9752) (2.6046) (3.0595) (2.3753) (2.8692) (2.5277)
Monthly business sales at
 W3 survey date (000s)
−9.5648 −1.2386 2.5551 0.6067 6.8759 −1.0964 3.6547 −5.5627
(7.6381) (4.3138) (2.1657) (3.7112) (5.7169) (4.2456) (5.1034) (4.9274)
Has any employees at
 W1 survey date
−0.1063 0.0493 0.0005 −0.0046 0.0575 0.0073 0.1563 0.0030
(0.0689) (0.0482) (0.0325) (0.0443) (0.0497) (0.0456) (0.0503) (0.0519)
Has any employees at
 W2 survey date
−0.1347 −0.0092 0.0073 0.0114 0.0594 0.0272 0.0410 0.0400
(0.0952) (0.0686) (0.0399) (0.0620) (0.0718) (0.0656) (0.0707) (0.0710)
Has any employees at
 W3 survey date
−0.2165 −0.1067 −0.0330 −0.0471 0.1811 0.0012 0.0651 0.1514
(0.1215) (0.0865) (0.0444) (0.0786) (0.0903) (0.0847) (0.0910) (0.0901)
log household income
 at W1
−0.0298 0.0827 0.1533 0.0553 0.0954 −0.2044 −0.0857 −0.0459
(0.1682) (0.1224) (0.0842) (0.1155) (0.1214) (0.1219) (0.1235) (0.1272)
log household income
 at W2
−0.0520 0.2167 −0.0061 −0.0581 −0.0788 −0.0174 0.1096 −0.0418
(0.2450) (0.1848) (0.1170) (0.1690) (0.1923) (0.1861) (0.1844) (0.1878)
log household income
 at W3
−0.0665 −0.1696 0.1455 −0.1582 0.1081 0.2505 0.2065 0.0258
(0.3592) (0.2569) (0.1183) (0.2385) (0.2635) (0.2441) (0.2637) (0.2683)
(continued)
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 relatively efficient method for redistributing to affected groups.35 We present treat-
ment effect interactions for minorities and females in Table 8A, columns 3 and 4, 
and estimate separate regressions for minority and female subsamples in Table 8B, 
columns 2 and 3. We do not find evidence that training has relatively strong or 
lasting effects for minorities or women. In fact, the point estimates for business 
ownership are negative for women at 6 and 18 months, producing overall effects 
on business ownership for the female subsample that are not statistically significant 
(Table 8B, column 3).
Human and managerial capital constraints are another important rationale for 
training subsidies: if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, 
35 See Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Fairlie and Robb (2008) for a discussion of customer and other forms of 
discrimination against minority business owners, and Altonji and Blank (1999) for a review of the larger literature 
on racial and gender discrimination in the labor market. 







Dependent variable (9) (10)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.1136 0.1777
(0.1010) (0.0775)
Business owner at W2 survey date −0.0119 0.1387
(0.1390) (0.1059)
Business owner at W3 survey date 0.1357 −0.1396
(0.1821) (0.1356)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date (000s) −1.6755 1.7888
(3.5875) (1.4655)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date (000s) −3.5339 0.9719
(5.0097) (2.5009)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date (000s) −9.5648 6.8971
(7.6381) (4.6315)
Has any employees at W1 survey date −0.1063 −0.0229
(0.0689) (0.0454)
Has any employees at W2 survey date −0.1347 0.0855
(0.0952) (0.0650)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.2165 −0.0368
(0.1215) (0.0839)
log household income at W1 −0.0298 −0.0282
(0.1682) (0.1213)
log household income at W2 −0.0520 0.0071
(0.2450) (0.1792)
log household income at W3 −0.0665 −0.0399
(0.3592) (0.2587)
notes: Each row represents a separate regression. Sample sizes are reported in Table 4. The 
wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of 
application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, 
education level, household income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in 
family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health 
insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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then subsidizing training may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute to the 
most affected parties. Self-employment training may be especially helpful to those 
lacking the main human capital factors found to be associated with business suc-
cess in the previous literature: education, previous managerial experience, and 
 previous experience working in a family business.36 However, estimates reported 
in Table 8A, columns 5–8 and Table 8B, columns 4–7 do not provide evidence that 
training has relatively lasting or strong effects on those with less education, less 
 previous managerial experience, less experience working in a family business, or 
less prior experience owning a business.
36 See Parker (2009), Fairlie and Robb (2008), and Van Praag (2005) for reviews of this literature. 





















Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business owner at
 W1 survey date
0.1209 0.0845 0.0317 0.1316 0.0812 0.1428 0.1613 0.2284
(0.0588) (0.0646) (0.0625) (0.0518) (0.0686) (0.0487) (0.0513) (0.0567)
Business owner at
 W2 survey date
0.0261 −0.0171 −0.0510 0.0621 0.1099 0.0730 0.0450 0.1035
(0.0680) (0.0741) (0.0700) (0.0593) (0.0776) (0.0550) (0.0578) (0.0634)
Business owner at
 W3 survey date
−0.0849 −0.0571 0.0061 −0.0270 0.1290 0.0214 0.0384 0.0007
(0.0797) (0.0898) (0.0814) (0.0690) (0.0906) (0.0620) (0.0645) (0.0705)
Monthly business
 sales at W1 survey
 date (000s)
−0.4417 0.1804 −1.0492 −0.7884 −0.6066 −1.8038 −0.6287 0.1271
(0.9823) (1.0300) (0.9957) (1.2675) (1.3648) (1.0789) (1.0550) (1.0673)
Monthly business
 sales at W2 survey
 date (000s)
2.4018 0.7291 −1.8542 −0.6780 1.1385 0.6934 −0.9273 −0.1807
(1.9300) (1.0475) (1.2998) (1.4052) (1.6936) (1.4469) (1.0897) (1.2290)
Monthly business
 sales at W3 survey
 date (000s)
1.2806 0.9949 −0.2497 −0.0367 −0.8944 −0.5805 −1.2355 0.9200
(1.4889) (2.0189) (1.0795) (2.2003) (1.8664) (1.8115) (1.3271) (1.6952)
Has any employees at
 W1 survey date
0.0430 0.0781 0.0077 0.0374 0.1004 0.0785 0.0476 0.0442
(0.0447) (0.0463) (0.0455) (0.0407) (0.0491) (0.0360) (0.0306) (0.0370)
Has any employees at
 W2 survey date
0.0442 0.0110 −0.0247 0.0131 0.0911 0.0100 0.0031 0.0098
(0.0514) (0.0545) (0.0491) (0.0463) (0.0551) (0.0389) (0.0360) (0.0411)
Has any employees at
 W3 survey date
−0.0337 −0.0213 −0.0427 0.0147 0.0731 −0.0125 −0.0060 −0.0184
(0.0527) (0.0608) (0.0511) (0.0476) (0.0614) (0.0405) (0.0389) (0.0447)
log household income
 at W1
0.0840 0.0986 −0.0467 −0.0505 −0.1849 −0.1971 −0.2262 −0.2502
(0.1406) (0.1739) (0.1363) (0.1204) (0.1609) (0.1001) (0.1015) (0.1110)
log household income
 at W2
0.1169 −0.0658 0.2654 0.0231 0.0840 −0.0304 −0.0081 −0.0359
(0.1592) (0.1749) (0.1465) (0.1218) (0.1775) (0.1084) (0.1089) (0.1222)
log household income
 at W3
0.0828 0.1197 0.0548 0.1043 0.2608 0.1284 0.0805 0.1533
(0.1783) (0.2044) (0.1694) (0.1464) (0.1856) (0.1239) (0.1346) (0.1402)
W1 sample size 1,491 1,448 1,636 2,100 1,268 2,355 2,138 1,870
W2 sample size 1,265 1,217 1,454 1,804 1,097 2,077 1,861 1,639
W3 sample size 958 915 1,167 1,382 844 1,686 1,484 1,335
notes: The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of applica-
tion. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household 
income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemploy-
ment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. Each row/column rep-
resents a separate regression.
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Unemployment insurance frictions are perhaps the most important, or at least 
most commonly invoked, rationale for training subsidies. Entrepreneurship training 
may be a relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by providing recipients 
with incentives to work by creating a job for themselves (and perhaps others).37 We 
test this by interacting treatment status with a measure of baseline unemployment. 
We find that those unemployed at baseline are in fact more likely to have a business 
at the six-month follow-up (Table 8A, column 8 and Table 8B, column 7). This 
effect disappears at later follow-ups, however: we find no effects in the longer-run. 
Nor do we find any other evidence of strong or lasting effects for the unemployed, in 
either relative (Table 8A) or absolute (Table 8B) terms. These results in Table 8A do 
not change if we compare the unemployed only to wage/salary workers, dropping 
those who were business owners at baseline.38
We also estimate treatment effect heterogeneity based on business ownership 
(yes/no) at baseline. These results show little evidence that training is effective for 
those who owned or did not own businesses when entering training, or relatively 
effective for nonbusiness owners when entering training (Appendix Table 10).
V. Conclusion
Although substantial resources are devoted to subsidizing entrepreneurship train-
ing around the world, we know very little about its effectiveness and whether it 
alleviates market frictions. We provide new estimates of average and heterogeneous 
treatment effects of entrepreneurship training from Project GATE. We find evidence 
that training increases business planning and business ownership in the short-run, 
but that the marginal businesses are unsuccessful and fail to produce tangible or 
subjective benefits at any of the three follow-up horizons (6-, 18-, and 60-months). 
We do not find any evidence that training shifts the distribution of firms in import-
ant ways (e.g., by disproportionately creating very successful firms) that might be 
missed by analysis of average treatment effects. Although we find higher attrition 
among the control group, bounds analyses confirm that only extreme forms of biased 
attrition would change these results.
Our analysis of treatment heterogeneity produces some novel insights about the 
theory and design of training interventions. Many of the rationales put forward for 
subsidizing training—countering credit or human capital constraints in enterprise 
development, or labor market discrimination—are not borne out by the data. We do 
37 Another explanation for why the unemployed may benefit more from job training is that they have more time 
to devote to it. But we do not find any evidence that the unemployed (at baseline) receive more or different training. 
38 We define the unemployed to include anyone who is not working in a wage/salary job or self-employed at 
the time of application. Participating in the GATE program implies some level of interest in work, and our defi-
nition facilitates a straightforward classification of the sample into the two main categories of unemployment and 
employment (i.e., wage/salary work or self-employment). We find similar results when using alternative defini-
tions of unemployment. First, we estimate both sets of regressions using UI recipients (which was used in the final 
evaluation report, Benus et al. 2009). Second, we estimate regressions using a slightly more restrictive definition 
of unemployment to include only those “looking for work” at the time of application. This is the definition used in 
Michaelides and Benus (2010) which builds on the final evaluation report by shifting the focus from UI recipients to 
the unemployed. They find stronger positive estimates of treatment effects for the unemployed than those reported 
for UI recipients in the final evaluation report. Under any and all definitions, we find positive effects on business 
ownership in the short-run, but no effects on any outcomes in the long run. 
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find evidence that entrepreneurship training has relatively strong positive effects on 
business ownership for the unemployed in the short run, but these effects disappear 
by the long run.
In all, the absence of positive effects of entrepreneurship training across numerous 
measures of business ownership, business performance and broader outcomes, and 
the estimated $1,321 per recipient cost of providing GATE training, suggests that 
entrepreneurship training may not be a cost-effective method of addressing credit, 
human capital, discrimination, or social insurance constraints. This conclusion con-
trasts with the positive benefit/cost conclusion reached in the final evaluation report 
submitted to DOL (Benus et al. 2009), and with similarly positive arguments prof-
fered by advocates of state-level programs.39 It also contrasts with the more positive 
findings related to the medium- and long-term effects of job training on labor market 
outcomes (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2010; Osikominu 2013).
Understanding more about the effects and mechanisms of entrepreneurship 
training is important given the continued growth and popularity of these programs 
around the world. Many financial institutions with a social aim now bundle business 
training with their loans. The Department of Labor recently funded a new round 
of GATE programs in four additional states based on the findings from the GATE 
Project, and President Barack Obama recently signed the Small Business Jobs Act, 
which expands funding to SBDCs throughout the country. Individual states also 
continue to extend Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs that were origi-
nally authorized by Congress in 1993 and made permanent in 1997.
Our results demonstrate the importance of understanding which components 
of training are more and less helpful, for which populations, and whether train-
ing might (only) be effective when bundled with complementary interventions. 
Many questions ensue, for example, should subsidies for entrepreneurship training 
be  re- allocated to job training? Should content from entrepreneurship training be 
grafted onto job training? Are there groups thus far not identified for whom entre-
preneurship training may be beneficial in the longer run? Would the effects of train-
ing be stronger if they were combined with greater availability financial capital, 
rather than merely providing assistance in applying for existing options? 40
39 For example, the New York Senate (2011) justified extending the SEA program by stating that it “has been 
extremely successful in helping individuals who are likely to exhaust their regular unemployment insurance benefits 
to develop and establish small businesses in New York … The success of this program is evident. Over 4,000 jobs 
have been created and $16 million in state tax revenue has been generated at no cost to the state.” 
40 Recent evaluations of entrepreneurship training in developing countries have yielded mixed results, and sim-
ilar questions of pedagogy, integration with other services, content, and market contexts persist. See McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2012) for a discussion and meta-analysis of these developing country studies. 
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1A—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training 
for Pittsburgh and Duluth Sites 
(with 94% Small Business Development center representation) Compare to Table 4
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.0928 0.1093 648
(0.0880) (0.0787)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0531 0.0624 576
(0.1249) (0.1127)
Business owner at W3 survey date −0.0184 −0.0279 475
(0.1768) (0.1643)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date (000s) −1.1131 −0.1398 604
(1.6308) (1.3387)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date (000s) −3.8658 −2.6955 524
(2.4441) (2.1200)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date (000s) −6.7211 −4.5823 451
(4.3437) (3.2430)
Has any employees at W1 survey date 0.0194 0.0220 646
(0.0454) (0.0443)
Has any employees at W2 survey date −0.0173 −0.0143 573
(0.0721) (0.0692)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.1237 −0.1114 473
(0.1142) (0.1112)
log household income at W1 −0.1393 −0.0387 591
(0.1774) (0.1382)
log household income at W2 0.2511 0.3699 513
(0.2699) (0.2184)
log household income at W3 −0.3520 −0.2129 432
(0.4113) (0.3283)
notes: The first stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on 
treatment. The second stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneur-
ship training. The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months 
after time of application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, mar-
ried, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health prob-
lems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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Appendix Table 1B—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training for Philadelphia Site 
(100% community Based organization representation) 
Compare to Table 4
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.0372 0.1014 903
(0.0814) (0.0740)
Business owner at W2 survey date −0.0583 −0.0375 745
(0.1167) (0.1103)
Business owner at W3 survey date −0.0786 −0.1750 551
(0.1904) (0.1981)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date (000s) −0.9343 −0.1970 843
(1.2288) (1.2704)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date (000s) 0.8949 1.1190 693
(1.0799) (1.2526)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date (000s) −0.0563 0.0693 519
(1.0094) (1.0611)
Has any employees at W1 survey date −0.0271 −0.0155 901
(0.0468) (0.0465)
Has any employees at W2 survey date −0.0869 −0.0590 741
(0.0747) (0.0742)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.0147 0.0044 549
(0.1252) (0.1335)  
log household income at W1 −0.0353 0.1894 823
(0.1735) (0.1440)
log household income at W2 −0.1082 0.0216 680
(0.2375) (0.2038)
log household income at W3 0.5542 0.8075 507
(0.4262) (0.4062)  
notes: The first stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on 
treatment. The second stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneur-
ship training. The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months 
after time of application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, mar-
ried, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health prob-
lems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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Appendix Table 2—Regressions for Probability of Receiving Entrepreneurship Training
W1 W2 W3
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.0242 0.0410 0.0413
(0.0259) (0.0276) (0.0295)
Black 0.0843 0.0694 0.1123
(0.0365) (0.0403) (0.0446)
Latino 0.0688 0.0878 0.1027
(0.0628) (0.0643) (0.0642)
Asian −0.1439 −0.0679 −0.0730
(0.0846) (0.0988) (0.1129)
Other 0.0072 0.0260 0.1006
(0.0487) (0.0536) (0.0550)
Not US born 0.0706 0.0498 0.0719
(0.0523) (0.0564) (0.0582)
Age 0.0100 0.0056 0.0017
(0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0113)
Age squared −0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married 0.0202 0.0308 0.0485
(0.0306) (0.0334) (0.0365)
Has children 0.0267 0.0154 0.0327
(0.0286) (0.0311) (0.0331)
Highest grade completed 0.0213 0.0393 0.0446
(0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0135)
College education 0.0136 −0.0304 −0.0652
(0.0498) (0.0540) (0.0570)
HH Income $25,000–49,999 0.0232 0.0250 0.0709
(0.0326) (0.0359) (0.0390)
HH Income $50,000–74,999 0.0185 0.0199 0.0705
(0.0414) (0.0456) (0.0498)
HH Income $75,000–99,999 0.0808 0.1354 0.2253
(0.0577) (0.0594) (0.0599)
HH Income $100,000+ 0.0917 0.0795 0.0980
(0.0565) (0.0603) (0.0651)
Wage/salary work −0.0133 −0.0089 −0.0311
(0.0380) (0.0425) (0.0453)
Self-employed with no employees 0.0795 0.0867 0.0274
(0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0493)
Self-employed with employees 0.0118 0.0315 0.0014
(0.0455) (0.0472) (0.0503)
Has a health problem 0.0037 −0.0063 −0.0032
(0.0470) (0.0520) (0.0586)
Has relatives or friends who have been previously S.E. 0.0406 0.0216 0.0270
(0.0319) (0.0341) (0.0370)
Ever worked for relatives or friends who are S.E. 0.0078 0.0248 0.0410
(0.0306) (0.0329) (0.0348)
Has a bad credit history −0.0395 0.0277 0.0369
(0.0293) (0.0318) (0.0346)
Currently receiving UI benefits −0.0386 −0.0297 −0.0610
(0.0292) (0.0312) (0.0330)
Has health insurance from current employer −0.0586 −0.0900 −0.0707
(0.0385) (0.0426) (0.0462)
Autonomy index 0.0066 −0.0156 −0.0078
(0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0139)
Risk tolerance index 0.0174 0.0176 0.0404
(0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0150)
Managerial experience 0.0142 0.0455 0.0554
(0.0279) (0.0299) (0.0327)
Treatment 0.1198 0.2980 0.4986
(0.3111) (0.3319) (0.3616)
(continued)
VoL. 7 no. 2 153Fairlie et al.: Behind the Gate experiment
Appendix Table 2—Regressions for Probability of Receiving Entrepreneurship Training (continued)
W1 W2 W3
(1) (2) (3)
Female × treatment −0.0216 −0.0557 −0.0635
(0.0327) (0.0333) (0.0352)
Black × treatment −0.0726 −0.0443 −0.0424
(0.0475) (0.0500) (0.0546)
Latino × treatment −0.0673 −0.0716 −0.0872
(0.0765) (0.0754) (0.0770)
Asian × treatment 0.1176 0.0108 0.0860
(0.1081) (0.1202) (0.1342)
Other × treatment 0.0194 0.0126 −0.0407
(0.0612) (0.0631) (0.0629)
Not US born × treatment −0.1275 −0.0941 −0.1264
(0.0683) (0.0703) (0.0763)
Age × treatment 0.0090 0.0069 0.0040
(0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0134)
Age squared × treatment −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Married × treatment 0.0040 −0.0086 −0.0441
(0.0385) (0.0401) (0.0429)
Has children × treatment −0.0196 0.0039 0.0161
(0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0390)
Highest grade completed × treatment 0.0109 0.0003 −0.0124
(0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0163)
College education × treatment −0.0352 −0.0327 0.0356
(0.0624) (0.0642) (0.0678)
HH Income $25,000–49,999 × treatment −0.0554 −0.0262 −0.0829
(0.0424) (0.0443) (0.0472)
HH Income $50,000–74,999 × treatment −0.0216 −0.0321 −0.0875
(0.0518) (0.0547) (0.0581)
HH Income $75,000–99,999 × treatment −0.0813 −0.1646 −0.2571
(0.0708) (0.0720) (0.0722)
HH Income $100,000+ × treatment −0.0573 −0.0680 −0.0968
(0.0677) (0.0708) (0.0751)
Wage/salary work × treatment −0.0189 −0.0173 0.0127
(0.0482) (0.0508) (0.0537)
Self-employed with no employees × treatment −0.0613 −0.0610 −0.0432
(0.0557) (0.0539) (0.0584)
Self-employed with employees × treatment 0.0488 0.0310 0.0283
(0.0545) (0.0533) (0.0569)
Has a health problem × treatment 0.0285 0.0052 0.0059
(0.0585) (0.0617) (0.0682)
Has relatives or friends who have been previously S.E. × treatment −0.0264 −0.0083 −0.0123
(0.0404) (0.0414) (0.0447)
Ever worked for relatives or friends who are S.E. × treatment −0.0099 −0.0086 −0.0060
(0.0377) (0.0386) (0.0402)
Has a bad credit history × treatment 0.0457 0.0010 −0.0225
(0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0404)
Currently receiving UI benefits × treatment 0.0552 0.0533 0.0827
(0.0373) (0.0380) (0.0399)
Has health insurance from current employer × treatment 0.1029 0.1439 0.1085
(0.0484) (0.0503) (0.0537)
Autonomy index × treatment −0.0046 0.0166 0.0137
(0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0175)
Risk tolerance index × treatment −0.0091 −0.0094 −0.0325
(0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0180)
Managerial experience × treatment 0.0302 −0.0100 −0.0212
(0.0351) (0.0362) (0.0392)
notes: All reported characteristics are measured at time of application, prior to random assignment. The wave 1, 
wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application.
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Appendix Table 4—ITT Estimates, Compare to Table 4
Intent-to-treat estimates
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.0464 0.0517 3,443(0.0166) (0.0153)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0216 0.0208 3,032(0.0179) (0.0172)
Business owner at W3 survey date 0.0095 0.0025 2,446(0.0197) (0.0194)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date −406 −369 3,210(282) (288)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date −186 −140 2,794(353) (353)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date −495 −620 2,323(539) (556)
Has any employees at W1 survey date 0.0131 0.0140 3,438(0.0092) (0.0095)
Has any employees at W2 survey date 0.0039 0.0020 3,023(0.0107) (0.0110)
Has any employees at W3 survey date −0.0172 −0.0209 2,436(0.0123) (0.0128)
log household income at W1 −0.0239 −0.0088 3,223(0.0319) (0.0251)
log household income at W2 0.0353 0.0195 2,797(0.0357) (0.0293)
log household income at W3 0.0541 0.0217 2,270(0.0415) (0.0353)
notes: The ITT model regresses the listed outcome on treatment. The wave 1, wave 2, and 
wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. Covariates 
include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, house-
hold income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad 
credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, 
and risk tolerance.
Appendix Table 3—Self-Reported Amount that Entrepreneurship Training  









How would you rate the overall usefulness of the services you have received?
Treatment group 51.7% 33.7% 8.5% 6.1%
Control group 35.8% 40.8% 10.8% 12.7%
Treatment group Control group
GATE Services A lot Somewhat Not at all A lot Somewhat Not at all
Helped with applying for loans 12.6% 21.5% 65.9% 5.9% 17.2% 76.8%
Helped with deciding whether
 to pursue self. emp.
39.5% 33.1% 27.4% 23.6% 30.0% 46.4%
Helped with refining the business idea 34.1% 37.2% 28.8% 23.0% 32.3% 44.7%
Helped with credit issues 16.4% 25.8% 57.7% 10.9% 17.3% 71.7%
Helped with developing a marketing strategy 31.4% 37.4% 31.2% 19.6% 31.6% 48.8%
Helped with legal issues 19.3% 35.5% 45.2% 11.3% 28.2% 60.6%
Helped with accounting issues 23.7% 35.9% 40.4% 12.1% 26.9% 61.0%
Helped with hiring and dealing with employees 12.7% 24.7% 62.6% 7.3% 18.1% 74.5%
Helped with networking 28.7% 37.9% 33.4% 23.1% 31.2% 45.7%
Helped with using computers and technology 13.3% 26.5% 60.2% 12.1% 22.2% 65.7%
Helped with dealing with clients 16.7% 35.1% 48.2% 11.3% 30.4% 58.3%
Helped with providing psychological support 16.6% 31.0% 52.4% 13.1% 23.8% 63.1%
notes: Sample includes treatment and control group participants who received any entrepreneurship training by 
wave 1 follow-up survey (six months). Evaluation of services was asked at W1.
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Appendix Table 5—Impacts of Entrepreneurship Training on Business Ownership, Entry and Exit
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.1252 0.1337 3,443
(0.0446) (0.0395)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0742 0.0691 3,032
(0.0616) (0.0570)
Business owner at W3 survey date 0.0406 0.0105 2,446
(0.0844) (0.0810)
Started business by W1 (no business at application date) 0.1678 0.1595 2,690
(0.0468) (0.0446)
Started business by W2 (no business at application date) 0.1017 0.0796 2,349
(0.0663) (0.0634)
Started business by W3 (no business at application date) 0.0321 −0.0094 1,886
(0.0893) (0.0887)
Exited business by W1 (had business at application date) −0.0391 −0.0743 663
(0.0854) (0.0886)
Exited business by W2 (had business at application date) −0.0426 −0.0434 605
(0.1284) (0.1329)
Exited business by W3 (had business at application date) −0.1441 −0.1084 498
(0.1971) (0.2057)
notes: The first stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on treatment. The sec-
ond stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneurship training. The wave 1, wave 2, and 
wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. Covariates include program site 
dummies, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at 
application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
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Appendix Table 6—Impact of Entrepreneurship Training on Employed, 
Additional Business Outcomes, and Work Satisfaction
Treatment-control (IV estimates)
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Employed (business owner or wage/salary)
 at W1 survey date
0.0681 0.0698 3,444
(0.0385) (0.0360)
Employed (business owner or wage/salary)
 at W2 survey date
0.0707 0.0643 3,034
(0.0464) (0.0435)
Employed (business owner or wage/salary)
 at W3 survey date
−0.0682 −0.0785 2,445
(0.0703) (0.0671)  
Number of employees at W1 survey date 0.2068 0.0946 3,438
(0.2907) (0.2683)
Number of employees at W2 survey date 0.1173 −0.1149 3,023
(0.3134) (0.2597)
Number of employees at W3 survey date −1.0727 −1.4223 2,436
(0.7061) (0.7462)  
Monthly profits (sales minus reported expenses)
 at W1 survey date (000s)
−1.2459 −1.1764 3,146
(0.4429) (0.4323)
Monthly profits (sales minus reported expenses)
 at W2 survey date (000s)
−0.1000 0.1406 2,736
(0.6608) (0.5819)
Monthly profits (sales minus reported expenses)
 at W3 survey date (000s)
−1.2445 −1.5505 2,281
(1.3906) (1.4154)  
Business outcome index at W1 −0.0605 −0.0518 3,146
(0.0631) (0.0611)
Business outcome index at W2 0.0129 0.0174 2,736
(0.0889) (0.0849)
Business outcome index at W3 −0.2075 −0.2377 2,278
(0.1181) (0.1212)  
Total business income from all businesses 
 owned from RA to W1 (000s) −1.2562 −0.7011
3,229
(0.8526) (0.8107)
Total business income from all businesses
 owned from W1 to W2 (000s) −0.2474 −0.3391
2,754
(1.5748) (1.5247)
Total business income from all businesses
 owned from W2 to W3 (000s) −6.6298 −10.0203
2,222
(13.8269) (14.0583)  
Annual business income from current 
 owned business at W1 (000s) −1.1087 −0.4360
3,272
(0.9983) (0.9536)
Annual business income from current 
 owned business at W2 (000s) −0.5841 −0.8564
2,830
(1.5026) (1.4704)
Annual business income from current 
 owned business at W3 (000s) −1.9026 −3.0512
2,361
(4.5183) (4.6203)  
Work satisfaction: “very satisfied”
 at W1 survey date
−0.0007 0.0153 3,409
(0.0455) (0.0450)
Work satisfaction: “very satisfied”
 at W2 survey date
0.0154 0.0302 2,992
(0.0625) (0.0620)
Work satisfaction: “very satisfied”
 at W3 survey date
0.0430 0.0511 1,924
(0.0998) (0.1031)
notes: The first stage in the IV (LATE) model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on 
treatment. The second stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneurship 
training. The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time 
of application. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, 
education level, household income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in fam-
ily business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insur-
ance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. The business outcome index is an equally weighted average of 
z-scores from sales, any employees, number of employees, and profits. Z-scores are calculated by 
subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation.
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Appendix Table 8—Treatment-Control Differences in Missing Values for Sales, 
Household Income, and Business Earnings
Treatment-control
Treatment Obs. Control Obs. No covars Covariates
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Missing monthly business sales 
 at W1 survey date
0.0722 1,758 0.0662 1,691 0.0060 0.0068
(0.0086) (0.0089)
Missing monthly business sales
 at W2 survey date
0.0742 1,563 0.0868 1,475 −0.0126 −0.0146
(0.0099) (0.0104)
Missing monthly business sales
 at W3 survey date
0.0487 1,274 0.0553 1,176 −0.0066 −0.0110
(0.0090) (0.0093)
Missing household income at W1 0.0626 1,758 0.0686 1,691 −0.0060 −0.0015
(0.0084) (0.0087)
Missing household income at W2 0.0800 1,563 0.0786 1,475 0.0013 0.0051
(0.0098) (0.0101)
Missing household income at W3 0.0754 1,274 0.0714 1,176 0.0039 −0.0002
(0.0105) (0.0110)
Missing total business income from all
 businesses owned from RA to W1
0.0660 1,758 0.0615 1,691 0.0045 0.0024
(0.0083) (0.0086)
Missing total business income from all
 businesses owned from W1 to W2
0.0921 1,563 0.0949 1,475 −0.0028 −0.0059
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Missing total business income from all 
 businesses owned from W2 to W3
0.0871 1,274 0.0995 1,176 −0.0124 −0.0111
(0.0118) (0.0121)
Missing annual business income from
 current owned business at W1
0.0529 1,758 0.0497 1,691 0.0032 0.0005
(0.0075) (0.0078)
Missing annual business income from
 current owned business at W2
0.0691 1,563 0.0678 1,475 0.0013 0.0002
(0.0092) (0.0095)
Missing annual business income from
 current owned business at W3
0.0369 1,274 0.0357 1,176 0.0012 0.0004
(0.0076) (0.0080)
notes: The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. 
Treatment-control differences with covariates are estimated from a linear probability model that controls for pro-
gram sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at 
application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer 
provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. The wave 3 sample for work satisfaction is restricted to 
include only the employed.
Appendix Table 7—Distribution of Businesses by Home Based and Structure  
at Wave 3 for Treatment Group, Control Group, and US Total

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business structure
No business 61.1% NA NA 62.1% NA NA NA
Sole proprietorship 22.5% 57.8% 56.7% 22.5% 59.4% 58.6% 72.6%
Partnership 1.6% 4.1% 4.8% 2.0% 5.3% 5.8% 5.9%
Corporation 12.0% 31.0% 31.3% 11.0% 29.0% 28.4% 21.0%
Other form 2.8% 7.1% 7.3% 2.4% 6.4% 7.3% 0.5%
Home based business
No business 61.1% NA NA 62.1% NA NA NA
Not home based 9.0% 23.1% 24.7% 8.8% 23.2% 21.9% 38.0%
Home based 29.9% 76.9% 75.3% 29.1% 76.8% 78.1% 62.0%
Sample size 1,263 491 316 1,154 438 275    
notes: United States totals in column 7 and column 8 are from the Survey of Business owners 2007 and 1997, US 
Census Bureau, respectively. These data include all nonfarm businesses with sales of at least $1,000. New busi-
nesses are individuals who did not own a business at the time of application to the program.
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Appendix Table 9—Nonexperimental Correlations between 
Entrepreneurship Training and Outcomes for Control Group
Nonexperimental estimates
No covars Covariates Obs.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.1965 0.1533 1,685
(0.0234) (0.0225)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.2579 0.2212 1,462
(0.0247) (0.0251)
Business owner at W3 survey date 0.2277 0.2098 1,162
(0.0277) (0.0297)
Monthly business sales at W1 survey date 836 561 1,575
(476) (463)
Monthly business sales at W2 survey date 1,248 1,285 1,337
(478) (533)
Monthly business sales at W3 survey date 2,058 2,035 1,101
(751) (867)
Has any employees at W1 survey date 0.0354 0.0304 1,685
(0.0130) (0.0132)
Has any employees at W2 survey date 0.0505 0.0442 1,457
(0.0149) (0.0158)
Has any employees at W3 survey date 0.0678 0.0641 1,158
(0.0176) (0.0186)
log household income at W1 0.1062 0.0012 1,571
(0.0466) (0.0388)
log household income at W2 0.0396 −0.0447 1,348
(0.0522) (0.0442)
log household income at W3 0.0833 −0.0285 1,082
(0.0653) (0.0639)
notes: In all regressions, the listed outcome is regressed on receipt of entrepreneurship train-
ing. The sample includes only observations for the control group. The wave 1, wave 2, and 
wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. Covariates 
include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, house-
hold income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad 
credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, 
and risk tolerance.
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Appendix Table 10 —Separate Entrepreneurship Training Impact Regressions for Nonbusiness 









Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Business owner at W1 survey date 0.1552 −0.1048 0.1662 0.0725
(0.0439) (0.0876) (0.0464) (0.0865)
Business owner at W2 survey date 0.0707 −0.0914 0.0646 0.0252
(0.0494) (0.0975) (0.0524) (0.0968)
Business owner at W3 survey date −0.0200 0.1217 −0.0060 0.0569
(0.0555) (0.1120) (0.0588) (0.1151)
Monthly business sales at W1
 survey date (000s) −0.9761 −0.9956 −0.4899 −3.3642(0.9818) (2.5736) (0.9754) (3.0861)
Monthly business sales at W2
 survey date (000s) −0.4010 −0.0891 −0.2023 −0.4412(1.2896) (2.6219) (1.3195) (2.9983)
Monthly business sales at W3 
 survey date (000s) −0.9186
1.9006 −0.3707 −0.9437
(1.5182) (4.8169) (1.5470) (4.1919)
Has any employees at
 W1 survey date
0.0326 0.0039 0.0357 0.0891
(0.0283) (0.0891) (0.0292) (0.1110)
Has any employees at
 W2 survey date
0.0100 0.0082 0.0034 0.0693
(0.0324) (0.0949) (0.0336) (0.1173)
Has any employees at
 W3 survey date
−0.0143 −0.1008 −0.0231 −0.0529
(0.0348) (0.0927) (0.0364) (0.1090)
log household income at W1 −0.1793 0.4107 −0.2015 0.3470
(0.0862) (0.2033) (0.0922) (0.2001)
log household income at W2 −0.0308 0.3884 −0.0335 0.4678
(0.0948) (0.2058) (0.1004) (0.2253)
log household income at W3 0.0467 −0.0379 0.0590 0.0930
(0.1123) (0.2165) (0.1191) (0.2345)
W1 sample size 3,359 3,359 2,692 667
W2 sample size 2,960 2,960 2,353 607
W3 sample size 2,387 2,387 1,888 499
notes: The wave 1, wave 2, and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of applica-
tion. Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household 
income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemploy-
ment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. Each row and columns 1–2, 
3, and 4 represent a separate regression.
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